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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Catherine Phillips*
INTRODUCTION
Public sector labor unions learned a difficult lesson this past
year: what the legislature giveth, the legislature may taketh away.
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana all passed legislation significantly
curtailing or eliminating collective bargaining rights for public sector
unions. State legislatures in nearly half of the remaining states are
considering similar legislation, threatening the rights of public sector
workers across the nation to engage in a core union activity: bargaining
with the employer on behalf of workers.2 This sweeping anti-union
legislative campaign suggests it may be time for the labor movement to
*Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2013.
1. J. Res. 11, 100th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wis. 2011), 2011 Wis. Act 10; H. Res.
101, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (enacted); S. 5, 129th Gen.
Assemb., (Ohio 2011); See also, Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Wisconsin Assembly Passes
Anti-Union Bill as Senate Democrats Stay Away, N.Y. TIMES, February 26, 2011 at
Al 2; Richard Simon, Anti-Union Push Gains Steam Nationwide, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011 /apr/02/nation/la-na-unions-20110402.
2. Simon, supra note 1. Additional anti-union legislation was also being
considered nationwide, even measures that had little to do with cost cutting. See,
e.g., John Miller, Judge Blocks New Anti-Union Idaho Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July
5, 2011, http://www.idahopress.com/news/judge-blocks-new-anti-union-law/article
10753b2e-a791-11 eO-880d-001cc4cOO2e0.html. This legislation, which the judge
found was pre-empted by federal law and thus invalid, sought to end a union practice
of supplementing members' wages in order to win government contracts by out
bidding competitors. Id. Thus, the rash of anti-union legislation is arguably about
more than just cost cutting. See Simon, supra note 1 ("[I]t's not just budgetary
concerns driving Republican officeholders to take on unions, traditionally a strong
Democratic ally.").
think seriously about a long-term judicial campaign to gain additional
constitutional protection for public sector labor activities. 3
Perhaps surprisingly, the constitutional protections for labor
activities, particularly public employee labor activities, are quite thin.4
Often times, Supreme Court cases addressing labor issues are strikingly
incongruent with other case law, failing to constitutionally protect labor
union activities while providing enhanced protections for similar
activities when done by non-union members. As discussed below, public
sector labor rights are almost entirely statutorily created, historically
having very little grounding in constitutional law.6
In recent years, some scholars and practitioners have argued that
labor organizing deserves greater constitutional protections, including
3. See, e.g., Thomas Linzey & Mari Margil Collective Bargaining as a
Constitutional Right?, Op-Ed., MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/117552243.html. Of interest, however, is
also the recent success in both Ohio and Wisconsin with galvanizing popular support
for unions to overturn anti-collective bargaining legislation. On November 8, 2011,
Ohio voters rescinded the anti-union legislation, returning the right to collectively
bargain to public employees. Sabrina Tavemise, Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting
Unions'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at Al.
In Wisconsin, union leaders recently presented an unprecedented one million
signatures to state election officials in order to begin the recall process for the
Governor who sponsored the anti-collective bargaining legislation. Monica Davey,
Organizers say 1 million Signed Petition to Recall Wisconsin Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2012, at A9.
4. See William A. Herbert, Public Sector Labor Law and History: The Politics
ofAncient History?, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 335, 345 (2011).
5. Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616
(1980) (holding that a statute banning secondary (i.e., not against employer) union
picketing that "predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business"
does not violate the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment), with NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) (holding that a boycott by the
NAACP was speech or conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
See also Alan Hyde, Exclusion is Forever: How Keeping Rights to Strike, Picket,
and Other Labour Speech Separate from Constitutional Rights Has Proven a Bad
Deal for American Labor Unions and Constitutional Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1517844; Charlotte Garden, Labor Values are First
Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns are Protected Speech,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2618 (2011).
6. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 345.
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greater First Amendment protection.7 However, no one heretofore has
specifically addressed public employee collective bargaining on its own
and where in the Constitution it might find theoretical protection.
This Note argues that collective bargaining by public employees
should receive heightened constitutional protection as part of the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. Part I will provide a
brief history of public employee unions, as well as a discussion
surrounding the constitutional status of public employees more generally.
This section will conclude with a discussion about why additional
constitutional protections for labor activities, particularly public sector
collective bargaining, are necessary.
Part II will examine the constitutional right to petition in its
historical context, arguing that the right to petition clause provided
constitutional protection for a pre-existent, institutionalized, and robust
democratic system of petitioning the government, as distinct from other
First Amendment rights such as speech and assembly. Part III will
examine Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the right to petition,
noting how the court has almost universally ignored the right to
petition's distinct historical content and original robustness,
incongruously conflating it with other First Amendment rights. This
section will conclude by discussing a recent right to petition case
involving public employees, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,9 which
provides the first extensive treatment of the right to petition as a
potentially distinct constitutional right with a historical content that is
unique from other First Amendment rights.
7. See generally Linzey & Margil, supra note 3; James Gray Pope, The First
Amendment, The Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize in the Twenty-
First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941 (1999) (hereinafter Right to Organize);
Garden, supra note 5; Hyde, supra note 5; James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of
Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942, 1027 (1997) [hereinafter Labor's Constitution].
8. The importance of constitutional protections for labor rights, particularly
ones narrowly tailored to protect public sector collective bargaining rights, will be
discussed more thoroughly below in Part I.C., infra notes 100-18 and accompanying
text.
9. _ U.S. ,131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495-2500 (2011).
10. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2495-2500. While the Court does not apply the
implications of its historical analysis to its holding, the discussion is significant,
nonetheless, insofar as it represents the first such extensive discussion. See id at
, 131 S. Ct. at 2501.
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Finally, Part IV will argue that public sector collective
bargaining should be protected under the right to petition the government
for redress of grievances clause of the Constitution." This argument will
rely in part on the robust and institutionalized character of the right to
petition historically as well as the analysis of the Petition Clause in both
the majority opinionl2 and Justice Antonin Scalia's partial dissent3 in
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri. Public sector collective bargaining
represents a logistically feasible, contemporary structure that is faithful
to the distinct historical content of the right to petition as an
institutionalized democratic practice, while still acknowledging the ways
in which society has changed since the time the Constitution was
written.14 As such, public sector collective bargaining should be
protected as part of the constitutional right to petition the government for
redress of grievances.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. I acknowledge that this argument may strike some
as purely intellectual, having no hope of being adopted by the current Supreme
Court. However, in response, I will borrow the argument made against similar
criticisms by James Gray Pope, Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law:
Social movements rarely obtain official endorsement of their
rights claims without first going through a period of exercising
those rights in the face of official legal hostility. Second, ideas
that might seem like romantic fantasies in the context of a
short-term litigation campaign can appear as hard-nosed
realism in the context of a multi-decade social movement for
fundamental legal change. Accordingly, I will not shy away
from considering even legal theories that would flunk the
straight-faced test in court today.
Right to Organize, supra note 7 at 941-42.
12. Borough ofDuryea, _ U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct at 2491-2501.
13. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2502-07 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
14. See generally Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142-43, 166
(1986) (noting that the right to petition the government historically required a
governmental response); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History
and Sigmificance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2154 (1998)
(discussing the right to petition in its historical context and the ways in which this
right has changed in modem politically society).
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I. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE LAW
In order to understand the importance of expanding the
constitutional protections for public employee collective bargaining, one
must first understand the history and current legal context of public
employees. Public employee unions have a distinct history and statutory
governing framework that is often neglected in scholarship.15 While
private sector employees have one statute that governs their rights to
organize,16 public sector employees' right to engage in various union
activities is dictated by a vast array of federal, state, and local legislation,
with wide variations.17 Additionally, public employees occupy a unique
place in the constitutional framework insofar as their relationship with
the govermnent is arguably unique from that of other citizens.8 In the
20th century, the Supreme Court extended the constitutional rights of
public employees, only to narrow those rights in recent decades. While
the narrowing of certain previously-extended constitutional rights is
relatively recent, one can already see the negative impacts on the job
security of public employees and the ethical functioning of
governments.19 Tracing these developments proves a useful lens to see
more clearly the significance of working towards expanded constitutional
protections for public employees, particularly the process of collective
. . 20bargaining.
15. JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS,
THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962 2 (2004) (noting the dearth of historical
scholarship about public sector workers); see also Herbert, supra note 4, at 338-39
(noting the "relative scarcity of historical and legal scholarship regarding public
sector labor issues").
16. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
17. See DONALD H. WOLLETT, JOSEPH R. GRODIN, & JUNE M. WEISBERGER,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 8-11 (4th ed. 1993).
18. See id. at 20.
19. See J. Michael McGuinness, Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti's
Early Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 24 TOURO
L. REV. 529, 530, 550-68 (2008) (discussing cases following Garcetti v. Ceballos,
537 U.S. 410 (2006), and how reducing protections for employee whistleblowing
may increase governmental corruption).
20. See id. at 530, 568.
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A. A History of the Statutory Protections for Public Sector Labor Unions
Union membership in the United States has been steadily
declining in the private sector since the 1950s.21 In 2010, only about
6.9% of private sector workers were union members. 22 Conversely,
unions represented 40% of public sector workers in 2010.23 At the local
level, the percentage is even higher, with unions representing almost
24
46% of the local public sector. From the numbers alone, the
organization of public sector workers would seem to be the sole success
story of the American Labor movement. 25
Notwithstanding these current numbers, the public sector labor
movement encountered substantially more problems than its private
sector counterpart in its early attempts to organize the public sector
26
workforce. For example, in 1902, during the otherwise labor-friendly
presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, federal employees were banned by a
series of executive orders from petitioning Congress for salary
increases.27 While this ban was lifted through the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
21
of 1912, no additional recognition of labor rights was enacted. Similar
attempts to limit the interactions between public employees and
legislative bodies were carried out at the state level as well.29
While the efforts of public sector workers to organize continued
to be thwarted at every turn, private sector labor unions finally received
statutory protections30 through the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
21. See James Gray Pope, Peter Kellman & Ed Bruno, "We Are Already
Dead": The Thirteenth Amendment and the Fight for Workers' Rights After EFCA,
67 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REv. 110, 110 (2010) (discussing the decline of private sector
union membership since the 1950s, when it reached its peak at thirty-five percent).
22. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls
.gov/cps/tables.htm#union (follow "Union affiliation of employed wage and salary
workers by occupation and industry" hyperlink).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Cf Pope et al., supra note 21, at 110-12 (discussing the inexorable decline
of the labor movement, particularly in the private sector).
26. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 1-11.
27. Herbert, supra note 4, at 348.
28. See id. at 349.
29. Id
30. See generally SLATER, supra note 15, at 71.
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which provided a regulatory framework within which private sector
workers could organize, petition, boycott, collectively bargain, and even
strike." By 1950, almost a third of the private sector workforce was
unionized, demonstrating, at least initially, the power of these protective
32measures.
Nonetheless, many commentators remained skeptical about the
wisdom of allowing public sector workers to unionize or to engage in
collective bargaining. 33 In 1937, another otherwise labor-friendly
president, Franklin Roosevelt, asserted that "the process of collective
bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be translated into the public
service."34 He reasoned:
The very nature and purposes of government make
it impossible for administrative officials to
represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual
discussions with government employee
organizations. The employer is the whole people,
who speak by means of laws enacted by their
representatives in Congress. Accordingly,
administrative officials and employers alike are
governed and guided, and in many cases restricted,
by laws which establish policies, procedure or rules
in personnel matters.
31. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
32. See Pope et al., supra note 21, at I10.
33. See WOLLETr ET AL., supra note 17, at 2-4.
34. Herbert, supra note 4, at 354. This quotation from President Roosevelt was
a favorite of conservative commentators during the recent debate in Wisconsin over
public sector collective bargaining rights. See, e.g., Mark Hemingway, FDR
Supports Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Feb. 19,
2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/fdr-supports-wisconsin-
governor-scott-walker_550456.html. However, Herbert points out that the use of a
single quotation from Roosevelt largely misrepresents his overall views about labor
rights. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 356-57. As a parallel example, Herbert cites a
speech by Ronald Reagan, within which Reagan stated, "where free unions and
collective bargaining is forbidden, freedom is lost." Id. at 357. Obviously,
conservatives would argue similarly that this quotation does not represent Reagan's
true views on labor rights. See id.
35. Herbert, supra note 4, at 354.
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Thus, government is inherently different from the private sector and its
employment relationships should be governed by a different set of rules.
Therefore, unions and collective bargaining are inherently incompatible
with public sector employment.16
Moreover, courts throughout this period continued to
significantly limit the rights of public sector unions. 3 7 Court decisions
prior to the 1960s gave public sector unions "no right to strike, to
bargain, or to arbitrate disputes, and government workers could be fired
simply for joining a union." 38 These cases reflected a judicial antagonism
39toward unions, linking union membership with negative traits such as
"disloyalty and inefficiency." 40 The cases also reflected a concern that
collective bargaining was "impossible between the government and its
employees, by reason of the very nature of government itself41 In part,
these cases also just reflect court deference to the administrative
42decisions of other branches of government.
It was not until the 1960s that public sector unions slowly began
to gain the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining with
governmental employers.43 These rights were not extended by
constitutional adjudication," despite the seeming congruity of labor
values with First Amendment values.45 Rather, these rights were
36. This argument is paralleled in contemporary critiques of public sector
unions and collective bargaining. See John 0. McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, The
Case Against Public Sector Unions: A Powerful Force for Unaffordable Benefits,
POL'Y REv. (Aug. 1, 2010) http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/
article/43266 ("[T]he potential benefits of unions . . . [are] probably nonexistent in
the public sector.").
37. SLATER, supra note 15, at 71-96.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 73.
41. Id. at 75.
42. Id. at 75-80.
43. Id. at 71.
44. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 8-11 (noting that the public
employee collective bargaining laws were primarily state laws, with a few minor
exceptions).
45. See Garden, supra note 5, at 2620-21 (discussing why labor values are
congruent with First Amendment values).
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extended by legislative and executive action at the federal, state, and
local level. 46
Wisconsin led the movement in terms of state and local support
for public sector collective bargaining.47 Beginning in the 1950s, the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) began a push to enact statutory protections for public sector
organizing and collective bargaining.48 Additionally, other labor
organizations, such as the Wisconsin Federation of Labor (WFL) and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), both previously private
sector labor organizations, publically pledged their support to the
growing public sector movement.49 Over several years, Wisconsin
enacted statutes that granted state and local public sector workers the
right to organize and collectively bargain for the first time in the United
States.o In the following decades, all but five states eventually passed
legislation permitting collective bargaining for at least some public
sector workers. Federal public sector workers received the right to
collectively bargain in the Federal Labor Relations Act of 1978.52
As noted at the beginning of this section, the increase in
statutorily created rights for public workers corresponded with a
dramatic increase over the last half-century in the percentage of
unionized public sector workers.53 Depending on the enabling legislation,
46. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 8-11.
47. See generally SLATER, supra note 15, at 158-92 (discussing the laws
Wisconsin passed in 1959 and 1962 that were the first to extend collective
bargaining rights to public employees). This fact, perhaps, helps to explain why what
happened in Wisconsin in 2011 was so galvanizing for the public sector labor
movement generally.
48. Id. at 164-65.
49. See id. at 176-77. The WFL described the legal status of public workers as
"discriminatory, unfair, and un-American." Id at 177.
50. Id. at 183-92.
51. State Bargaining Rules, TR TEACHER RULES, ROLES AND RIGHTS,
http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope/ (last visited April 12, 2012).
52. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. ch. 71).
53. Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR
FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm#union (follow "Union affiliation of employed
wage and salary workers by occupation and industry" hyperlink) (noting that in
2010, 40% of public employees were represented by unions), with supra notes 43-50
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teachers, police officers, firefighters, office workers, janitors, or other
public sector laborers may, to varying degrees, be represented by a union
and have the right to negotiate with the state or local government about
salaries, working conditions, benefits, or other issues.54 Most statutes
followed the model of the National Labor Relations Board and
established a system of exclusive bargaining units, where one union
would represent and bargain for an entire class of workers."
The collective bargaining process usually begins with a series of
informal discussions between employee representatives and the
56
government-employer. Statutes often provide some kind of requirement
that the parties negotiate in "good faith."" If informal discussions do not
yield an agreement, the parties may be required to utilize additional
methods for reaching a consensus. 8 These additional methods can
include more informal mechanisms, such as voluntary fact-finding and
mediation, which allows the parties to continue negotiating with a neutral
mediator who is empowered to make findings of fact and use other
methods to facilitate an amicable resolution to the conflict.5 9 Or, the
parties may also be required to participate in a formal procedure such as
binding arbitration, which binds the parties to whatever decision the
60
arbiter deems appropriate.
Unlike in the private sector, public sector workers usually do not
have the right to strike should the tenor of the discussions shift to the
61
government's favor. Moreover, protections against employer
retribution for public sector employee speech about wages and working
and accompanying text (discussing how public employees did not even begin to gain
statutory rights to organize until the 1960s); see also supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text (discussing the decline in private sector union membership over
similar timeframe as the public sector saw a marked increase).
54. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 8-11.
55. See id at 10. For example, one union would represent all firefighters, while
another might represent all police officers. Cf id (noting the use of exclusive
bargaining units in the public sector).
56. Id. at 72.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 321-22.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 329-33.
61. Id. at 252.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 6612012]
conditions may be less robust than they are in the private sector.62 Thus,
much of the power of public sector unions hinges not on their ability to
organize strikes, pickets, or other informational campaigns, as they often
do in the private sector, but on their ability to collectively bargain with
the government-employer. The fruits of collective bargaining may be
seen in the increased salaries and benefits afforded unionized public
sector workers as compared with non-unionized workers.64
Notwithstanding this success-or perhaps because of it-in the
past year, almost every state that has allowed collective bargaining either
has passed legislation removing these hard-won rights or is considering
passing such legislation.6 Given the already pared-down rights of public
sector unions, as compared with their private sector equivalents, it is not
difficult to see that the erosion of collective bargaining rights in the
public sector could finally decimate the last bastion of American unions.
B. Public Employees and the Constitution
Public employees occupy a unique space in constitutional law
because the government, whose behavior is circumscribed by the
62. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 350. The reasons for this will be discussed
more thoroughly in Part .B.
63. Cf WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 8-11 (noting the rarity of public
sector strike provisions and briefly discussing other "strike substitutes" relating to
the collective bargaining process); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Emps., Celebrating
50 Years of Collective Bargaining in the Federal Government, NAT'L FED'N OF FED.
EMPS. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nffe.org/ht/display/ArticleDetails/i/38516
(providing a public sector union's discussion about the importance of collective
bargaining).
64. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE
STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls
.gov/cps/tables.htm#union (follow "Median weekly earnings of full-time wage and
salary workers by union affiliation, occupation and industry" hyperlink). As is
evident on the linked chart, this benefit also applies to unionized, as compared with
non-unionized, private sector workers. Id. In a country increasingly concerned about
rising income inequality, this power of unions to increase the wages and benefits of
middle-class and working-class Americans should be not easily dismissed,
regardless of one's initial opinions about unions.
65. See Simon, supra note 1 (noting that over 700 pieces of legislation have
been filed that would limit public sector collective bargaining in almost every state).
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66
Constitution, is also their employer. In general, the Court has been
reluctant to treat the Constitution as relevant to the employment
decisions of public employers, distinguishing between the government as
67
sovereign and the government as employer. Nevertheless, some
scholars have criticized this distinction between the government as
employer and the government as sovereign, noting this separation is a
68
court-constructed fiction. The extent to which public employees receive
constitutional protection for their labor activities depends on the extent to
which the Court is willing to apply the Constitution to the government
acting as an employer.69
In the 1800s, Justice Olive Wendell Holmes famously noted that
a public employee "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman., 70 In other words, the
government could fire an employee for exercising her constitutional right
to speak, not because she did not have a constitutional right to speak, but
because she did not have a constitutional right to a government job.7 The
government acting as sovereign could not take any action against a
citizen for exercising a constitutional right; however, the government
acting as an employer was free to fire someone for exercising a
constitutional right.7 2
In 1967, the Court softened its position on public employment,
finally settling on a more balanced approach that rejected the notion that
66. WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 20.
67. Id.; see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, _ U.S. ,_ , 131 S.Ct.
2488, 2501 (2011) (noting that constitutional protections for citizens do not give
public employees the "right to transform everyday employment disputes into matters
for constitutional litigation in the federal courts").
68. See, e.g., Risa Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector
Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 597 (1986); William W. Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of
Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16
UCLA L. REV. 751 (1969).
69. See, e.g., Borough of Duryea, U.S. at _, 131 S.Ct. at 2501 (holding
that the public employee was not protected from retaliatory firing by his
government-employer after filing a lawsuit and grievance complaint, both activities
otherwise protected by the Constitution, when the subject of these acts was not a
matter of public concern).
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"public employment . . . may be conditioned upon the surrender of
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government
action."73 Thus, public employees were no longer required to surrender
74
their constitutional rights as a precondition to employment. This
approach evolved in most areas of constitutional adjudication involving
public employment into a balancing test that pitted the government's
interest in an efficient and effective workplace against the employee's
constitutional rights.
Specifically in relation to public employee free speech, the Court
developed a public concern test, applying the balancing test only if the
employee speech was a matter of public concern.76 If a public employee
speaks as a private citizen or an employee on a private matter, then that
speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may be subject to
government retribution.77 If a public employee speaks as a citizen about a
matter of concern to the public, then the First Amendment protects that
speech against government-employer retaliation, unless that protection is
outweighed by some legitimate governmental interest.78
More recently, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,79 the Court narrowed the
public concern test further to apply only when public employees do not
speak as part of their official job duties. There, a deputy district
attorney was retaliated against for attempting to highlight police
misconduct as part of his official case review duties. The Court held
73. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding that
Fourth Amendment privacy interests of public employees must be balanced against
the legitimate governmental interest of having an "efficient and proper . . .
workplace"); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (noting public
employee free speech rights must be balanced with government's legitimate interest
to have an efficient workplace).
76. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75.
77. Id. In other words, if a public employee speaks on a matter of private
concern, then they receive no constitutional protection. Id. If a public employee
speaks on a matter of public concern, then they receive constitutional protection
against retaliation, but only insofar as their freedom of speech is not outweighed by a
legitimate governmental interest. See id.
78. Id. at 571-74.
79. 537 U.S. 410 (2006).
80. See id. at 421.
81. Id. at 413-15.
664 [Vol. 10
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that when a public employee's speech is simply part of "performing his
or her job duties," 82 then it receives no constitutional protection from
employer discipline, even if that speech is on a matter of public
concern.83 The Court reasoned that "[riestricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen." 84 Public employees still have a right to contribute to the civic
discourse, but they do not have a right to "perform their jobs however
they see fit."85
This public concern test is one of the most significant hurdles to
overcome in order for public employees to receive additional
86constitutional protection for their labor activities. Labor organizing
activities are quintessentially "private" concerns according to the Court.
While one can argue that the very nature of public employment makes all
employment issues a matter of public concern, a majority of the Court
has not yet been so persuaded.
82. Id. at 423.
83. Id. at 421. See generally McGuinness, supra note 19 (providing a detailed
discussion of how Garcetti and its progeny have severely hampered the First
Amendment rights of public employees, most devastatingly in whistleblowing
cases).
84. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
85. Id at 422. This language is particularly striking insofar as the Court never
discusses the nature of the particular way in which the public employee here saw fit
to do his job. At issue here was arguably not an issue of differing opinions about
how one should do one's job. Rather, at issue was a public employee who. sought to
highlight police fraud in securing a warrant and was punished for doing so. That the
Court would lump such facts under a general statement, such as, public employees
do not have the "right to perform their jobs as they see fit[,]" trivializes what
arguably should be a major concern of the judiciary: the integrity of our criminal
justice system. Id.
86. See Herbert supra note 4, at 350.
87. Id. at 349-50.
88. See Garcetti, 547 U.S at 413-15, 421 (denying constitutional protection to
employee speech that is regarded as part of his or her job duties even when the
speech for which the employee was allegedly retaliated against involved the
revelation of police misconduct); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (rejecting
the assertion that an employee's questionnaire about the operation of the District
Attorney's office was a matter of public concern). This hurdle of the public concern
test will also be discussed more thoroughly below in Part III in the context of the
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However, two facts complicate this otherwise significant hurdle.
89
While Pickering, which first articulated the public concern standard,
was an opinion with only one Justice in dissent, both cases that followed
and narrowed the public concern standard, Connick v. Myers90 and
Garcetti v. Ceballos,91 had only 5-4 majorities. Within the dissenting
opinions, one finds support for a much more expansive understanding of
public concern, which could include labor speech about terms and
conditions of public employment.92
For example, in Connick, Justice William Brennan, Jr. notes in
his dissent: "It is hornbook law, however, that speech about 'the manner
in which government is operated or should be operated' is an essential
part of the communications necessary for self-governance, the protection
of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment."" Justice
Brennan goes on to note that, based on the voluminous newspaper
articles on the subject, the internal functioning of the Orleans Parish
District Attorney's office appears to have been a matter of great public
concern, 94 despite the majority of the Court holding otherwise.95 Perhaps,
therefore, the Justice reasoned, the Court's understanding is too narrow
to mesh either with what actually interests the public or with what kinds
of speech the First Amendment is designed to protect.96
In Garcetti, the four dissenting Justices filed three separate
opinions. 9 7 Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent provides the most strident
critique of the Court's recent jurisprudence:
Petition Clause and Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, U.S. , 131 S. Ct.
2488 (2011).
89. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968).
90. Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
91. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
92. This is important insofar as the Free Speech public concern test has been
extended to the Petition Clause. Borough of Duryea, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at
2488. While I will argue in Section III that this extension is improper given the
distinct history of the Petition Clause, a broader understanding of "public concern"
would also succeed in allowing labor petitioning about employment terms and
conditions to be constitutionally protected. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 350.
93. Connick, 461 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 160 n.2.
96. Id. at 163-64.
97. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 412 (2006).
The notion that there is a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the
course of one's employment is quite wrong. Over a
quarter of a century has passed since then-Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected
'the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his
protection against governmental abridgment of
freedom of speech if he decides to express his
views privately rather than publicly.'98
Thus, while the public concern test is good law, it has received
significant dissent from within the Court, as well as from scholars; 99 and,
in theory, future Courts may yet expand the First Amendment protections
for public employee speech beyond the narrow confines recognized
today.
C. Public Sector Collective Bargaining: The Current Need for Additional
Protections
Supporters of ending public sector collective bargaining argue
that the states' current budget crises require cuts in public employee
benefits and salaries that should not be subject to union approval or
negotiations. 100 Many disagree philosophically with the very idea of
public sector unions, much less collective bargaining.' Notwithstanding
these commentators, numerous other scholars and practitioners have
recognized the importance of the labor movement for the health of the
98. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979)).
99. Id.; see also Lieberwitz, supra note 68, at 597 (analyzing the framework
the Court uses to decide labor cases dealing with employee speech); Van Alstyne,
supra note 68, at 753-54 (describing the increasing support of the court in cases
dealing with public employment); cf McGuinness, supra note 19, at 530 (describing
the decrease in public protection after recent Court decisions); Cynthia L. Estlund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment
Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1990) (describing problems with the
public concern test).
100. See Fred Siegel, Editorial, How Public Unions Took Taxpayers Hostage,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, at Al5.
101. McGinnis & Schanzenbach, supra note 36 ("[T]he potential benefits of
unions [are] probably nonexistent in the public sector.").
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nation's democracy and for maintaining reasonable benefits, salaries, and
working conditions for all workers. 102
Moreover, grounded in this appreciation of the vital role of labor
unions as well as the fragility and inadequacy of entirely statutorily-
based rights, some scholars and practitioners have argued that labor
organizing deserves greater constitutional protections, including greater
First Amendment protection.'o3 First, scholars argue that the current state
of constitutional protections for labor is bad constitutional law insofar as
opinions regarding labor issues are irreconcilable with other Supreme
Court opinions relating to similar actions by other types of groups.
Protecting labor organizing is congruent with basic First Amendment
principles and thus the Court's jurisprudence should reconcile its
divergent case law to expand protections for labor activities.105 Second,
as seen recently, statutorily created rights are easily lost.106 Just as the
Civil Rights movement launched a successful legal campaign that
changed the way the Supreme Court approached issues of race, equal
protection, and due process, the labor movement needs to launch a long-
102. See generally MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER, 8-23 (2d ed.
1998); see also Garden, supra note 5, at 2649-59 (discussing the importance of labor
unions to our democracy).
103. See, e.g., Linzey & Margil, supra note 3 (arguing why collective
bargaining should be seen as a constitutional right); Garden, supra note 5, at 2632-
43 (arguing that labor speech receive the same constitutional protection as other
forms of political speech); Right to Organize, supra note 7 at 945-49 (arguing that
articulating the need for the constitutional protection of labor activities will be
crucial to re-invigorating the labor movement).
104. Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,
616 (1980) (holding that a statute banning secondary (i.e., not against employer)
union picketing that "predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary
business" does not violate the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment), with
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982) (holding that a
boycott by the NAACP was speech or conduct protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments); see also Garden, supra note 5, at 2617; Right to Organize, supra note
7, at 949-53; Hyde, supra, note 5, at 4.
105. See Garden, supra note 5, at 2647-59.
106. See Linzey & Margil, supra note 3; see also Hyde, supra note 5 at 4-5
(describing how a Department of Labor requirement was held unconstitutional by
the Court); Right to Organize, supra note 7, at 947 (discussing how the Constitution
is superior to statutory law).
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term legal campaign to change the way the Supreme Court approaches
issues of speech, assembly, and petition in the labor context. 07
However, no scholar has yet specifically addressed public
employee collective bargaining on its own and where in the Constitution
it might find theoretical protection. Rather, collective bargaining tends to
get lumped in with other labor activities such as picketing, boycotts,
strikes, and general labor speech. os While all labor activities are
invariably intertwined, collective bargaining in the public sector arguably
deserves distinct constitutional treatment.
First, collective bargaining is the primary tool public sector
unions use to gain appropriate benefits, salaries, and working conditions
for their members. 1 09 Most public sector workers are not allowed to
strike, which removes a powerful labor-organizing tool from the
available options."o Moreover, public sector union speech is in some
ways more strictly circumscribed than private sector union employee
speech because the government is the employer. 111 Thus, if public sector
unions are to be more than unions in name only, they need to maintain
the power of collective bargaining.
Second, collective bargaining, as noted above, has become the
lynchpin in the movement to erode the power of public sector unions.13
Legislatures may not be able to limit the right of public employees to
107. See Linzey & Margil, supra note 3; see also Hyde, supra note 5 at 4-5
(describing how a Department of Labor requirement was held unconstitutional by
the Court); Right to Organize, supra note 7, at 947 (discussing how the Constitution
is superior to statutory law).
108. See, e.g., Right to Organize supra note 7, at 953.
109. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 8-11.
110. MICHAEL T. LEIBIG & WENDY L. KAHN, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZING
AND THE LAW 23 (1987).
111. See generally United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 78 (1947)
(upholding the Hatch Act). As will be discussed more fully in Section III, this
statement is true regarding issues of working conditions, salaries and benefits insofar
as these issues have been held to be matters of private concern. See infra Part Ill.
Public sector employees do still enjoy their constitutional rights when they speak as
citizens about matters of public concern. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 574-75 (1968) (forbidding discharge of public employee for exercising First
Amendment rights of free speech).
112. See supra note 63.
113. See Simon, supra note 1.
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join unions completely,114 but legislatures can seriously undermine the
content and significance of this associational right by removing the
union's power to collectively bargain."' Given the narrow focus of the
anti-collective bargaining legislation, development of a narrowly-tailored
constitutional argument in support of collective bargaining is necessary
because it opens up a path to challenge the constitutionality of these new
laws.11 Other, less-narrowly tailored constitutional arguments about
public sector union rights necessarily leave substantial room for the
Court to uphold other union rights, such as association, speech, or
assembly in general, while simultaneously allowing the removal of
rights, such as collective bargaining, that arguably are what give actual
content and effect to the other rights.l 17 Thus, in order to preserve the
114. Courts have generally upheld the right of public employees to join a
union under the Association Clause. See, e.g., AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d.
137, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1969). However, what that means in terms of actual substance
beyond the power to associate with a union is a matter of debate. See WOLLETT ET
AL., supra note 17, at 23-25.
115. See WOLLETT ET AL., supra note 17, at 23-25.
116. Wisconsin unions did file a federal lawsuit alleging that the anti-
collective bargaining law was unconstitutional as it violates the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. Wis. Educ. Ass'n
Council v. Walker, No. 3:1 ICV00428, 2011 WL 2349069, at **81-93 (W.D.Wis.
June 15, 2011). However, they put forth no argument that collective bargaining
should be a constitutional right as such. Id Rather, their First Amendment argument
rests on the fact that the Wisconsin legislation only impacted some public employee
unions, while continuing to allow collective bargaining for other groups, like police
officers. Id. The argument rests on equal protection grounds and the somewhat more
robust protections of the right of public sector unions to deduct dues for workers'
paychecks. Id. Thus, the constitutional argument is rather thin, if perhaps the only
currently viable one. Cf id. The complaint did not argue the legislation violated the
right to free assembly, right to free speech, or the right to petition the government.
Id.
117. See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463
(1979). There, the Court upheld as constitutional a public employer's refusal to
allow a union to file grievance complaints on behalf of its members. Id. at 463-64.
The Court noted that there was no prohibition against the public employees joining
unions or "advocating any particular ideas" and thus no infringement on the
employees' First Amendment Rights. Id at 465. However, the Court noted that the
First Amendment imposes no "affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to
respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it." Id.
Thus, the Court upheld the right for the union to exist while eviscerating the right to
engage in acts from which the union's actual power flows. See id.
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important role that labor unions play in democracy and for workers, the
labor movement needs to take seriously the task of developing a
constitutional argument to protect public sector collective bargaining
rights in a way that imposes an obligation on the government not only to
listen to grievances but also to respond in some formalized way.
II. THE RIGHT TO PETITION IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The right to petition, unlike other First Amendment rights,
imposes a positive obligation on governments to listen to grievances and
to respond in some formalized way. The text of the First Amendment
provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging. . . the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."" 9 In most contemporary cases addressing the
right to petition, the Supreme Court collapses this right into other First
Amendment rights, such as the freedom of speech or right to peacefully
assemble.120 Moreover, the right is discussed in a way that places little to
no obligation on the government to listen or respond to these petitions.121
However, such an understanding bears little resemblance to the practice
and understanding of government petitions in the colonial and post-
colonial era when the constitution was written.122 Historically, the
practice of petitioning "was an affirmative, remedial right which required
governmental hearing and response.,,123 Petitioning was a formalized
system that structured how citizens communicated with the government
and how the government responded to those communications.124 There
was not, however, any formalized system that required the government to
118. Cf id (demonstrating how in the absence of such a constitutional
argument the effectiveness of public sector unions may be dramatically reduced).
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
120. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479,482 (1985).
121. See Smith, 441 U.S. at 465 (holding that public employees have the right
to petition the government but they have no right to a response); Minn. State Bd. for
Cmty Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (holding that the Constitution does
not grant citizens the right to be heard by governing authorities).
122. Higginson, supra note 14, at 142-44; see also Mark, supra note 14, at
2153-61.
123. Higginson, supra note 14, at 142.
124. See id. at 144-47.
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hear and respond to all acts of speech or assembly. 12 Thus, unlike the
freedom of speech and assembly, the right to petition clause enshrined as
a right a pre-existing and formalized system of petitioning for public and
private grievances.126
Moreover, the right to petition was understood to be a
foundational right essential for the working of a representative
democracy. 12 It was seen as the primary way whereby elected officials
could stay informed about what concerned citizens in their jurisdiction in
between elections.128 Representative democracy was possible because of
elections and petitioning, equally.129
The historical narrative below demonstrates both how the right
to petition clause served to protect a robust, essential, and
institutionalized democratic practice3 o and also how its eventual demise
explains the Supreme Court's failure to appreciate the distinct nature of
this right by the time the Court began to consider challenges under the
Petition Clause in the 20th century.
A. Pre-Revolutionary Petitioning
In pre-Revolutionary American colonies, petitioning the
government for a redress of grievances was a formalized process
whereby individuals would request governmental assistance for anything
from divorce to an "investigation of the treatment of prisoners."' 32
People submitted private petitions, public petitions for legislation, and
"petitions appealing courts' decisions," reflecting the quasi-judicial and
125. See Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances:
Constitutional Development and Interpretations, at 1 (August 1971) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University) (available in the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill Law Library).
126. Id; see also Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition
Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, in FREEDOM
OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, 85-90 (Margaret M. Russell ed., 2010).
127. Higginson, supra note 14, at 144-45.
128. See id.
129. See id
130. See infra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 158-93 and accompanying text.
132. Mark, supra note 14, at 2182.
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legislative role of the colonial assembles. 133 Indeed, the colonial
assemblies' primary duty was to receive and respond to the issues raised
- - 134-in citizen petitions. Both the specific process for submitting citizen
petitions and the process for the government hearing and responding to
these petitions were dictated by British common law.' As such,
petitions determined the legislative agenda of the colonial assemblies to a
significant degree.136 Moreover, the government was required not just to
allow citizens to file petitions, but it was required to hear and respond in
some fashion to these citizen grievances. 137 The government failing to
hear or respond to a petition was considered a grievance in and of
itself.138
Even at a time in which only propertied white males could vote,
people from all genders, races, and social strata could and did petition the
government for redress of their grievances.139 In one particular instance,
a group of freed African-Americans successfully petitioned the
government to have "their wives and daughters be exempted from paying
poll taxes."140 Further evidence exists of petitions by women, Native
Americans, and other free and enslaved African-Americans.141 These
groups of individuals, though not permitted to vote, were allowed to
petition the government for grievances, both public and private, and
receive a hearing and a response from governmental officials.142 Thus,
133. Higginson, supra note 14, at 145. Examples of petitions include: debt
relief, reimbursement for care provided to the indigent, financial assistance to other
governing authorities, divorce, "tax policy, land distribution, [and] monopoly
grants." Id. at 150.
134. Id. at 145.
135. See generally Smith, supra note 125.
136. Higginson, supra note 14, at 144-45.
137. See Smith, supra note 125, at 47-57 (discussing the various colonial
petitions and responses of both colonial governments and the British Parliament to
these petitions).
138. See id. at 57.
139. Mark, supra note 14, at 2162, 2177-88.
140. Id. at 2185. "A group of African-Americans, even free, acting in concert
on a political matter was as incendiary an action as could be conceived in the slave
South. All the more stunning, then, that the petition was not simply heard, but
granted." Id.
141. Id. at 2184-86.
142. Id.; Higginson, supra note 14, at 145.
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the institutionalized practice of petitioning was not limited to only certain
topics or people. 143
Indeed, the Revolutionary War can be seen, in part, as a reaction
to the British government's failure to respond to colonial petitions.
The text of the Declaration of Independence reads as such, stating "[i]n
every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the
most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by
repeated injury."1 4 5 This wording suggests that one key issue enraging
the colonists was that the British government was not hearing or
responding to the colonists' petitions adequately.146 Moreover, the
remaining text of the Declaration reads like a long list of grievances, of
the type one might find within a formal petition; a fact, suggesting here
again, the prominence of formal petitioning and the extent to which a
hearing and response was the accepted norm.147
B. The Constitutional Right to Petition
When the Constitution was being written, the expectation that
petitions would receive a hearing and a response was so normative that
much of the debate surrounded not whether petitioning was a right, but
whether that right itself included the right to have the government
respond in whatever way the petitioner wanted.148 Thus, a leading
political figure could question whether it is "'improper for freemen to
petition for their rights? If it be; then I say that the impropriety consisted
only in their not demanding them."' 1 4 9 As the colonists transitioned to
being independent people, they questioned the deferential tone and
format of pre-revolutionary petitions.'so Should the method of petitioning
143. See Mark, supra note 14, at 2184-86; Higginson, supra note 14, at 145.
144. Smith, supra note 125, at 57-64.
145. UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 30 (U.S. 1776)
(emphasis added).
146. Mark, supra note 14, at 2191-92.
147. Id.; see also Higginson, supra note 14, at 155; Smith, supra note 125, at
57-64; Spanbauer, supra note 126, at 89.
148. Mark, supra note 14, at 2206-07.
149. Id. In other words, free people should not have to submissively petition a
government for redress of grievances. Rather, such a person should have the freedom
and authority to tell the government what to do on his or her behalf See id.
150. Id.
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not be converted into a universal right to instruct the legislative
bodies?' 5' Instructing legislative bodies implied that citizens would tell
their legislators specifically how to redress a particular grievance and
that the legislature would be bound to act in the manner the citizen
instructed.152
Whether free citizens should "instruct" or "petition" was also
debated in terms of what would be the most effective system for the new
country.153 The debate centered on understandings of representative
democracy and the relationship between citizens and their
representatives.154 Throughout these debates, however, the implicit
assumption was that something like the pre-existent system of petition-
in which citizens' grievances were heard and acted upon-was
essential. 55 Absent from the debate was any suggestion that this right
should not be central to the new nation. This scarcity of constitutional
debate demonstrates not only the foundational significance of the right to
petition but also the normative nature of the formal system that made
such communications with government possible and productive.' 57
C. The Disappearance ofPetitioning
In the early days of the new nation, petitions were heard and
acted upon in much the same way as had been done prior to the
American Revolution. Petitions were referred to committees, debated,
and some response, positive or negative, was formulated.1 5 9 The content
151. Id. at 2206-10.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 2207-10.
154. See id.
155. See id.; see also Higginson, supra note 14, at 155. "That the Framers
meant to imply a corresponding governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear
given the history of petitioning in the colonies and the colonists' outrage at
England's refusal to listen to their grievances." Id.
156. Mark, supra note 14, at 2206 (noting "everyone assumed it was part and
parcel of the rights to be preserved").
157. See id.
158. Higginson, supra note 14, at 156.
159. Id.
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of petitions set the legislative agenda for each day.160 However, several
challenges to the system of petition began to arise.161
First, as the nation grew and transitioned from local assemblies
to a national body, logistical challenges arose when trying to respond
appropriately to all petitions.162 Additionally, the nature of petitions
began to shift from private, individual petitions to petitions from
members of organized groups advocating for a particular policy
change.163 Thus, petitions became less an instrument of an individual
communicating grievances to his or her government and more the
instrument of a particular group's demands or even propaganda.
In particular, abolitionists organized a nationwide petition drive
beginning in the 1830s.165 In support of their petition drive, they invoked
the constitutional right to petition and to have such petitions receive a
hearing and a response.166 After various tactics designed to avoid hearing
and responding to the abolitionists' petitions, Congress passed a law
stating that "no petitions or resolutions 'praying the abolition of slavery
. . . shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way
whatever."' 1 67 This gag rule, as it came to be known, was the first time
the new Congress formally distanced itself from the colonial common
law assumptions that petitioning on whatever topic automatically
required a hearing and a response.168
160. Id. at 157. Indeed, Congress began its day by reading all the citizen
petitions received. Id.
161. Mark, supra note 14, at 2212-13.
162. Id. at 2212-14; Higginson, supra note 14, at 157.
163. See Higginson, supra note 14, at 157.
164. Id. Compare, for example, the difference between the types of personal
petitions, such as divorce proceedings, heard during colonial times, id. at 146, with a
petition drive organized by a group of abolitionist in an attempt to have slavery
abolished in the United States, id. at 158-65.
165. Id. at 158.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Cf id. at 158-60 (noting how petitions were initially "received and
considered, typically by referral to committees" in the early days of Congress and
how Congress initially responded to Abolitionist petitions with informal mechanisms
to avoid hearing and responding to these petitions).
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This controversy introduced the now recognizable modern
position that the right to petition, generally,169 does not impose any
obligations upon the government to hear or respond to petitions.'
During the gag rule debate about abolitionist petitions and the years that
followed, Southern Congressmen argued that there should be a sharp line
separating citizens and legislators.171 Legislators should set the
legislative agenda, not citizens.172 Citizens were still free to petition their
governments,'7 3 but their rights ended upon submission of the petition.174
Thereafter, the legislature could act in whatever manner it deemed
appropriate in hearing or not hearing, responding or not responding, to
citizen petitions. 17 5 Thus, whatever the previous system of petitioning
had required in terms of governmental hearing and response, an
argument developed during this time that limited petitioning to freedom
of expression and created no positive obligations on the government to
169. But see Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, _ U.S. _, _, 131 S.
Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011) ("A petition conveys the special concerns of its author to the
government and, in its usual form, request action by the government to address those
concerns.").
170. Higginson, supra note 14, at 166 (noting Supreme Court cases confining
the right to petition to being about free expression).
171. Id. at 157-62 (discussing Senator John Calhoun from South Carolina and
his assertion that requiring the government to consider and respond to citizen
petitions was a "grave menace"); id. at 159 n. 117 (citing Congressman Rayner, of
North Carolina, on Abolition Petitions in the House of Representatives on June 15,
1841 ("the inherent and necessary right of every legislative body to protect itself...
in the exercise of its legal functions.")).
172. Id. at 157-62.
173. Id. One of the arguments against the abolitionist petitions was that they
were unlawful because slavery had pre-existed the Constitution and been adopted
therein, no person could now lawfully "seize upon the property of any citizen." Id. at
160. Moreover, people argued that the petitions were unlawful because they did not
directly impact the petitioner as such. Id.
174. Id. at 160.
175. Id. Many southern Congressmen felt vehemently that they could not even
be forced into discussing this issue. In the words of Congressman Raynor of North
Carolina, "'[t]he discussion, on our part,'. . . 'is of a defensive character-we want
no discussion-we call for no action-but we simply ask to be let alone."' Id.
(quoting The Question of the Reception of Abolition Petitions: Hearing before the
H.R., 27th Cong. (1841) (statement of Rep. Rayner)).
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hear or respond.176 One can see this argument reflected in later Supreme
Court jurisprudence, as discussed in the next subsection.177
Nonetheless, at the time of the gag rule, some members of
Congress did resist the interpretation that the right to petition did not
create any positive obligation on the government to hear and respond to
citizens' petitions.178 John Quincy Adams was the primary proponent for
the position that the system of petitioning required at least a
governmental hearing and some response.179 He maintained that the right
to petition the government was the foundational civic practice to protect
citizens in the period between elections. 80 Each petition continued to
deserve a fair hearing and response. Adams argued vehemently for a
return to the historical understanding and system of petitioning as faithful
to the Constitution and the spirit of democracy.182
Other supporters of petitioning went even further in their critique
of Southern attempts to alter the previously shared understanding that
governments were required to hear and respond to citizen petitions.183
For example, John Dickson from New York stated:
176. See id. at 157-62.
177. See id. at 166 (noting until the Court acknowledges the disconnect
between the history of petitioning and the Court's jurisprudence, the Court will
continue to "appear to rest [its Petition Clause opinions] not on the Framers' intent,
but on deference to the resolve of antebellum Congresses to defeat a right which
threatened the institution of slavery").
178. See, e.g., id
179. Id. at 162-64; see also SPEECH OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS UPON THE RIGHT
OF PEOPLE TO PETITION (Arno Press 1969); id. at 58, (discussing with great
indignation examples of Congress failing to even read citizen petitions); id. at 55
(noting how Congress had failed to read or consider petitions dealing with slavery
and that "this was the process whereby the right of petition had been broken down").
180. Higginson, supra note 14, at 162-64.
18 1. Id.
182. See id.
183. David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance
of the Right to Petition, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND
PETITION: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 76
(Margaret M. Russell ed., 2010). Adams had agreed that the governmental response
could simply be to refer the matter to a legislative committee, where it could be
tabled from further consideration at that time. Id. at 75. Some scholars believe it is
possible that this concession inadvertently also eroded the substantive right to
petition. Id. at 80.
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A right "to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances" is secured to the people. But, sir, of
what use to the people is the right of petition, if
their petitions are to be unheard, unread, and to
sleep "the sleep of death," and their minds to be
enlightened by no report, no facts, no
arguments?'
Foundationally, Adams and his allies asserted "that the right to petition
implie[s] duties to hear, consider, debate, and decide." 85 In recognizing
these implicit governmental duties, they recognized the distinctiveness of
petitioning as a democratic institution, not just a right to self-
.186
expression.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by much of the constitutional
jurisprudence since that time, the anti-abolitionists ultimately won the
argument, significantly narrowing the practical import of a formally
robust democratic right.'8 In 1836, Congress passed the "gag rule"
forbidding the considerations of citizen petitions "relating in any way, or
to any extent whatever, to the subject of slavery, or the abolition of
slavery,"' against objections that this rule was unconstitutional. 189In
the decades that followed the imposition of the gag rule, petitioning
would slowly lose steam as a civic practice and as a formal democratic
institution that determined Congressional agendas. 90 Thus, by the 20th
century, the Court could more or less conflate the right to petition with
the freedom of speech or the right to assemble without obvious error.
The once robust civic institution that had been enshrined as a
constitutional right, by which citizens could communicate grievances to
184. Id. at 76 (quoting John Dickson).
185. Higginson, supra note 14, at 163.
186. See, e.g., id. at 163-64 (discussing the argument that petitioning requires
some response from the government); see also id. at 165 (noting how the right to
petition later was reduced to being about free expression).
187. Id. at 165-66; see also infra Part 111.
188. Frederick, supra note 183, at 78.
189. Id. at 79.
190. Id.
191. See Higginson, supra note 14, at 166 (noting that courts have detached
the meaning of the petition clause from its historical context that required a hearing
and response).
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the government and be ensured of a hearing and response,192 became a
mere afterthought in constitutional jurisprudence. 193
III. RIGHT TO PETITION JURISPRUDENCE
Compared with other parts of the First Amendment, such as
speech, press, and religion, the Supreme Court's discussion of the right
to petition is relatively sparse.194 Moreover, most cases that do discuss
the right to petition conflate it with other First Amendment rights.195 The
Court has, at times, even given the Petition Clause meaning only as a
modifier of other rights, carving out special rights for speech and
assembly that relate to petitioning the government.196 Moreover, the
Court has largely discussed the right to petition as being about freedom
of expression.197 The Court's approach necessarily neglects the more
formalized nature of historical petitions, which required the government
not just to refrain from obstructing citizen petitions, but to actively listen
and respond to all petitions.' Thus, there has been a disconnect between
the robust, formalized historical system of petitioning and the Court's
192. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
194. See Spanbauer, supra note 126, at 90; see also Mark, supra note 14, at 48
(noting that "[m]odern doctrine has elevated the protections for speech and press,
while the protection of petitioning has not stayed proportionally greater; indeed, it
has been all but subsumed in the protections of speech and press.").
195. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
196. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 354-55 (1937). Scholars
have also been guilty of reading the First Amendment in a way that makes the
Petition Clause a mere modifier of the assembly clause, using questionable
grammatical analysis and an avoidance of historical analysis. See, e.g., Jason
Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 183, at
26. But see Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment Defining the Right, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra
note 183, at 33 (noting that "the drafting history ... suggests more of an effort at
economy of language than an intent to make the rights of assembly and petition
dependent upon each other").




flaccid understanding of the Petition Clause for much of the country's
history.199
However, a recent case involving the right to petition in a public
employment context does hint at the Petition Clause's distinctive
character through the Court's relatively lengthy discussion of the distinct
historical legacy and substantive content of the right to petition in both
the majority opinion200 and the partial dissent.201 The Court recognized
202
for the first time the unique history of petitioning, including its
203 .204
institutionalized form, its requirement of a hearing and response,
205
and its distinctiveness from the Speech and Assembly Clauses.
However, the Court blunted the impact of this discussion by refusing to
follow its own logic, ultimately putting forth a holding that once again
206
conflated the right to petition with the freedom of speech, despite its
207
analysis to the contrary. Nonetheless, the door is cracked, albeit
slightly, to the potential for a deeper and broader understanding of how
the right to petition might be distinct from the other rights enshrined in
208
the First Amendment. Most importantly, the door is cracked enough to
allow the labor movement to think about what a robust right to petition
would look like in the 21st century in terms of protecting public
employee collective bargaining.
199. Compare supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text (discussing the
origins of the right to petition), with supra notes 194-98 (discussing the court's
treatment of the petition clause), and infra notes 200-08 (discussing the court's
recent treatment of the clause).
200. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2488
(2011).
201. Id. at-, 131 S. Ct. at 2502 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
202. See id. at 131 S. Ct. at 2498-2500.
203. See id. at 131 S. Ct. at 2499.
204. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2495.
205. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2500.
206. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2501.
207. See id at , 131 S. Ct. at 2498-2500.
208. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2495 ("There may arise cases where the special
concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a distinct analysis;
and if that is so, the rules and principles that define the two rights [Speech and
Petition] might differ in emphasis and formulation.").
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A. Cut from the Same Cloth
Most often, the Court has stated that the right to petition is "cut
209
from the same cloth" as the other First Amendment rights. Indeed,
many of the Court's right-to-petition discussions occur when no actual
petition is at issue, demonstrating the Court's conflation of this right with
21 211other First Amendment rights.210 For example, in Thomas v. Collins,
the Court overturned the conviction of a labor union organizer for
violating a restraining order that forbade him from soliciting union
212members in Texas2. Here, the facts of the case implicated the First
Amendment rights to free speech and peaceful assembly.2 The
petitioner's actions were directly aimed at soliciting union membership,
not petitioning the government for a redress of grievances.214
The Court, nonetheless, discussed all the First Amendment rights
as implicated because while, "not identical, [all the rights] are
inseparable."215 The Court noted that the right to petition applied to
economic, as well as political and religious grievances, despite there
216
being no government petition at issue. Thereafter, the Court discussed
the freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, which were relevant to
217the facts of the case. Thus, the Court, while mentioning the Petition
Clause, failed in any of its discussion to mention the Clause's distinctive
historical content or apply the Clause's substantive meaning to the facts
218
of the case.
Even in cases in which the right to petition was germane to the
facts, the Court nonetheless has tended to conflate the freedom of speech,
the right to assemble, and the right to petition, as if they were
219
equivalent. In United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
209. Spanbauer, supra note 126, at 85.
210. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 520-23, 530 (1945).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 518.
213. See id. at 520-23.
214. Id.




219. See Spanbauer, supra note 126, at 85.
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220
Association, the Court held that a labor union's right to hire an
attorney to handle the workers' compensation claims of members was
protected by the freedom of speech, right to assemble, and right to
petition.2 Here, the lawsuit presumably constituted a petition and thus
222
the right to petition was relevant to the facts of the case. Nonetheless,
the Court provided no analysis of the right to petition as distinct from the
223
other applicable rights of assembly and speech. This conflation of the
right to petition with other First Amendment rights blurs the arguably
distinct nature of the historical content and understanding of the right to
petition, making it about expression-about yelling your grievances to
the wind-rather than a formalized democratic process that required a
224
governmental hearing and response.
Insofar as the Court has discussed the right to petition in any
distinct way, the discussion has been short and largely a-historical and a-
textual.225 Nonetheless, in general, the Court has held that the right to
226
petition extends to petitions targeting all branches of government. The
227
right to petition has been extended to corporate entities, and it also
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.228 Though
lawsuits have been held to be petitions, the Court has held that the right
220. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
221. Id. at 221-22.
222. See id, at 218; see also Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404
U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (noting that "the right of access" to courts is part of the Petition
Clause).
223. United Mine Workers of America, 389 U.S. at 218-24. The point here is
not to argue that First Amendment rights are not related. Rather, the point is to
highlight how the Court has almost never even acknowledged that such a distinct
discussion might be appropriate. Given the distinct history of petitioning, this
omission is striking.
224. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,
465 (1979); see also supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
225. See United Mine Workers of America, 389 U.S. at 217 (1967) (discussing
the right to petition in brief along with the freedom of speech and assembly);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (discussing the right to petition simply
as "cognate" with other First Amendment rights).
226. See Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510.
227. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 558 U.S. ,, 130 S. Ct.
876, 913 (2010).
228. United Mine Workers ofAmerica, 389 U.S. at 221 n.4.
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to petition creates no obligation on the government to hear or respond to
229
petitions.
However, none of these cases engaged in a lengthy discussion
about the right to petition as a right substantially distinct from other First
Amendment rights, ensuring that its history as a robust and foundational
democratic practice is all but forgotten in our current age.230 The Court
repeatedly considered the right to petition as "cut from the same cloth" or
virtually indistinguishable from other First Amendment clauses, most
notably the assembly clause and the speech clause.231 In doing so, the
Court has failed to appreciate how the right to petition is historically
distinct from the other constitutional rights and how this distinctiveness
might inform their jurisprudence.232 Without an appreciation of the
historical context of petitioning, the Court has invariably narrowed the
meaning of the Petition Clause, most notably removing the requirement
that petitioning implies the government must have a formalized system
233
for hearing and responding to these petitions. Instead, the Clause has
become primarily about another right to self-expression, which creates
234
restraints on governmental actions but no positive obligations.
B. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri: A Notable, Albeit Small, Step in the
Right Direction
The paucity of judicial discussion highlighted above was finally
remedied in a recent case dealing with a public employee grievance
235
lawsuit, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri2. However, more extensive
discussion about the distinctive purpose and history of the right to
petition led to the incongruous solidification of the Court's prior
reductionist treatment of the right to petition as indistinguishable from
229. See Smith, 441 U.S. at 465; Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight,
465 U.S. 271 (1984). Any requirement of the government to respond to lawsuits has
been dealt with under the due process clause, rather than the right to petition clause.
Andrews, supra note 196, at 95.
230. See Spanbauer, supra note 126, at 90.
231. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
232. See Spanbauer, supra note 126 at 90.
233. See id.; see also Smith, 441 U.S. at 464-65.
234. See Spanbauer supra note 126, at 90; see also Smith, 441 U.S. at 464-65.
235. _ U.S. , 131 S. Ct 2488 (2011).
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236
other First Amendment rights. In Guarnieri, a police chief alleged his
employer had taken retributive action against him subsequent to his filing
a union grievance challenging prior action by the borough.23 7 The police
chief argued that his union grievance constituted a petition and thus was
protected from retaliation by the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment.238 The District Court "instructed the jury that the lawsuit
and the union grievances were 'protected activity . . . under the
constitution."'239 The jury awarded Guarnieri compensative and punitive
damages.240
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the ruling, but not the
punitive damages, holding that "a public employee who has petitioned
the government through a formal mechanism such as the filing of a
lawsuit or grievance is protected under the Petition Clause from
retaliation for that activity, even if the petition concerns a matter of
solely private concern." 24 1 Thus, the Third Circuit did not extend the
242
public concern test applied in other First Amendment contexts to the
right to petition context.243 However, courts in other circuits had
extended the public concern test to the right to petition context, finding
that the Speech Clause and Petition Clause overlap significantly enough
to warrant such an extension.244 The Court thus heard Guarnieri to
resolve a split in the circuits as to whether the public concern test applied
245
to cases arising under the Petition Clause.
In its discussion, the Court, on the one hand, provided the most
extensive discussion to date of the distinct history and purpose of the
246
Petition Clause. The Court acknowledged that "[a] petition conveys
the special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual
236. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
237. Borough of Duryea, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2492.
238. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2492.
239. Id. at ,131 S. Ct. at 2492.
240. Id. at ,131 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
241. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
242. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
243. See Borough ofDuryea, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2493.
244. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2493.
245. See id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2491.
246. See supra Part 1I1.A for a history of the Court's jurisprudence relating to
the Petition Clause.
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form, requests action by the government to address those concerns."247
The Court went on to even more clearly, though reservedly, recognize
248
that at least some petitions imply a required response.
The Court also discussed the distinct history of petitioning,
noting that petitions historically involved matters of both private and
public concern.249 The Court traces, in brief, the history of petitioning
from the Magna Carta to the Declaration of Independence, as well as the
history of petitioning in the early days of the United States.250 The Court
even recognized that, rather than the Petition Clause being a modifier of
other rights, it was in fact historically the source of other rights like
251
freedom of speech. Unlike the Supreme Court's previous paucity of
discussion, the Court for the first time recognized the distinctive
substance and historical importance of the Petition Clause.
Nonetheless, the Court still failed to carry out all the
implications of its discussion, relying for its ultimate holding on old
categories that do not cohere with its historical analysis. For example, the
Court still discussed the right to petition as being about freedom of
expression, noting "[t]he right to petition allows citizens to express their
ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected
,,212
representatives. However, petitioning understood to be primarily
about expression, without a requirement for the government to listen or
respond, bears little resemblance to the history of petitioning discussed
253
elsewhere in the opinion.
Most incongruently, the Court extended the free speech doctrine
about matters of public concern to the Petition Clause, holding that
247. Borough ofDuryea, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2495.
248. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2496 (noting that "[u]nlike speech of other sorts, a
lawsuit demands a response").
249. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2498.
250. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2498-2500. "Petitions allowed participation in
democratic governance even by groups excluded from the franchise." Id. at _, 131
S.Ct. at 2499-2500. Notably, the Court cites both the Higginson, supra note 14, and
Mark, supra note 14, articles discussed in detail above.
251. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2500 ("The right to petition is in some sense the
source of other fundamental rights, for petitions have provided a vital means for
citizens to request recognition of new rights and to assert existing rights against the
sovereign.").
252. Borough of Duryea, U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2495.
253. See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
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public employees are not protected from retaliatory actions by their
employers when their petitions relate to matters of purely private
concern.254 Despite a lengthy discussion about the private nature of
petitioning and the inconsistency generally with the development of free
speech jurisprudence, the Court found the two rights to be similar enough
255
to warrant the extension of the public concern doctrine.
Despite the case's holding, the Court's overall discussion is
important for two reasons. First, the Court, in discussing the historical
significance of petitioning, opens the door to further holdings that could
carve out a distinct place for the right to petition, beyond the narrowing
256logic of it being about freedom of expression alone. In acknowledging
the formal process whereby petitions were not just issued, but also
responded to, the Court undercut its own logic that petitioning is just
about shouting one's grievances to the wind.25
Second, the Court acknowledged, however guardedly, for the
first time that the Petition Clause in and of itself may imply a required
258governmental response, at least in limited circumstances. While the
Court's discussion may not open the door to a new, more substantive
appreciation of the Petition Clause as far as some might like, it does open
the door nonetheless.259 After over a century of jurisprudence that failed
to significantly appreciate the distinct content of the Petition Clause, this
small opening may be potentially significant in future Petition Clause
254. Borough ofDuryea, U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2495-2500.
255. Id. Justices Thomas and Scalia argue as much in their separate concurring
and dissenting opinions, noting the distinct history of the Petition Clause as well as
the private nature of the majority of historical petitions. See id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at
2501-02 (Thomas, J., concurring); id at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2503-06 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). See also supra Part I.B.
(discussing the public concern doctrine).
256. See Mazzone, supra note 196, at 29.
257. Compare Borough of Duryea, _ U.S. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2498-50
(majority opinion), with id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
258. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 2495 (majority opinion) ("A petition conveys
the special concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests
action by the government to address those concerns.").
259. Cf id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2495 ("There may arise cases where the
special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a distinct
analysis; and if that is so, the rules and principles that define the two rights might
differ in emphasis and formulation.").
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cases.260 Thus, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri is a notable first step in
opening up a future argument that the Petition Clause could help protect
public sector collective bargaining.261
IV. PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
A "PETITION"
As argued above, first, petitioning historically was a formalized
system whereby citizens would communicate grievances, both public and
262
private, to the government. Moreover, petitioning assumed a
263
governmental obligation to listen and respond accordingly.
Historically, the formalized democratic institution of petitioning eroded,
in part, because elected officials desired to avoid discussing the
264
controversial issue of slavery. Additionally, challenges also arose as
the population of the United States grew, making it logistically difficult
for Congress to hear and respond to every citizen petition.265 Given the
current population size of the United States, it seems unlikely that one
260. Cf id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2503-07 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the unique history of petitioning in depth
for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion).
261. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2498-2500 (majority opinion); see also id. at ,
131 S. Ct. at 2503-07 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
It is important to note also the discussion supra at notes 86-99 and the
accompanying text, discussing the fragile status of the narrow public concern test.
The narrow public concern test, as currently understood by the Court, asserts that
such matters as salary, benefits and other employment matters-the very topic of
public employee collective bargaining-are not a matter of public concern. See
supra notes 76-99 and accompanying text. For the Petition Clause to protect public
employee collective bargaining, either the holding in Guarnieri expanding the public
concern test to the Petition Clause would have to be overturned; or the Court's
understanding of the public concern test would have to return to its earlier
jurisprudence before the recent narrowing. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying
text. The later seems most likely, given the strong dissents of at least four justices
that the employment condition and terms of public employees are certainly matters
of public concern. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 165-93 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
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could simply transpose the 19th century system of petitioning onto the
266
21st Congress with any logistical success.
Second, despite the Court's repeated failure to recognize its
distinctiveness, the right to petition is categorically different from other
267
First Amendment rights. While the Speech and Assembly Clauses
contain within them a right for citizens to take some action (speak,
assemble) and the government to avoid actions (i.e., not arrest or
otherwise hinder these rights), the right to petition should include both a
right for citizens to take some action and an obligation for the
government to take some affirmative action-to hear and respond to the
268
petition. Blurring the three rights as one obfuscates this distinction and
consequentially narrows the once robust right to petition in terms of the
269
Court's understanding.
Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that the right to petition
extends to all branches of government.270 Further, the Court has
recognized, while failing to extend the implications to its holdings, the
271
unique historical content and meaning of petitioning. Perhaps in the
coming decades, the Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri discussion will lay
the foundation for an expanded appreciation of the Petition Clause by the
Court and its historically foundational role in stabilizing this nation's
272
democracy.
266. See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 14, at 157 (noting that "systemic strains"
began to appear even in the nineteenth century that made it logistically difficult to
hear and respond to every citizen petition). Thus, it is unlikely, for logistical reasons,
that Congress will institute a system whereby its business for the day is set by citizen
petitions, which Congress would then proceed to hear and respond to in a formalized
way-though such would no doubt be an improvement on the current state of affairs,
even if it did quickly create a backlog of petitions.
267. See supra Part II (discussing the unique historical content of the Petition
Clause).
268. See id.
269. See supra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding the Petition Clause and the narrowing of the substantive content of
petitioning when it is conflated with other First Amendment rights).
270. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
271. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
272. Cf Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, U.S. ,, 131 S.Ct.
2488, 2503-07 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing the unique historical content of the Petition Clause).
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In the meantime, the labor movement should not wait for the
Court to act in order to harness the implications inherent in the Guarnieri
discussion as providing a constitutional hook for the protection of public
employee collective bargaining.2 73 Historically, the labor movement has
successfully harnessed the power of the people to interpret the
Constitution, in the face of initial institutional opposition, in order to
274
bring about social change. Here, the historical content of Petition
Clause could provide a powerful foundation for expanding the
constitutional protections for public workers. The system of collective
bargaining by public employees is an example of an already existent
institutional framework that coheres with the substantive, historical
content of the Petition Clause.275
Just like the historical system of petitioning, collective
bargaining is a formalized system whereby citizens communicate their
grievances and desires to a governmental entity that is required to listen
276
and respond in some fashion. Of course, as with petitioning, the
27
government need not respond as the public employees wish. But, the
collective bargaining system requires government representatives to
respond to public employee grievances, just as the historic system of
278
petitioning did. During collective bargaining, the government usually
must negotiate in good faith, participate in mediation or even binding
279
arbitration, if an informal agreement cannot be reached. The
grievances discussed over collective bargaining are arguably of both
273. See generally Labor's Constitution, supra note 7, at 942-46 (discussing
the historical "constitutional insurgency" of the labor movement that "advanced their
own interpretations of the Constitution, usually in opposition to those of the
Supreme Court" in order to effect social change); see also supra Part I.C.
274. See Labor's Constitution, supra note 7, at 942-46.
275. See supra Parts I & II.
276. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing collective
bargaining).
277. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between the historical system of petitioning, which did not require the exact
response desired, and the proposed, but not adopted system of instruction, which
would have required the government respond in the exact manner the citizen
desired).




private and public concern, just as historical petitions were,280 impacting
both the employment terms of public employees as well as overall public
281budgets. While much of the institutional framework that would be
needed to take seriously the robust nature of the right to petition does not
282
currently exist, a system of collective bargaining does. Were labor
unions to use these analogies between historic petitioning and
contemporary collective bargaining, in time, unions may not only build a
stronger labor movement but also finally provide public workers more of
the official constitutional protections they deserve.
280. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing the process of
collective bargaining).
282. See id.
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